Convertible securities overcoming double moral hazard in venture capital by Verkasalo, Hannu
Helsingin yliopisto - Helsingfors universitet - University of Helsinki ID 2006-479
Tiedekunta-Fakultet-Faculty
Faculty of Social Sciences
Laitos-Institution-Department
Department of Economics
Tekijä-Författare-Author
Verkasalo, Hannu
Työn nimi-Arbetets titel-Title
Convertible securities overcoming double moral hazard in venture capital
Oppiaine-Läroämne-Subject
Economics
Työn laji-Arbetets art-Level
Master's thesis
Aika-Datum-Month and year
2006-09-12
Sivumäärä-Sidantal-Number of pages
82 s., 30 liites.
Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
The problem of double moral hazard is prevalent in venture capital financing. This &#1088;r&#1086;blem refers to the fact that there are two
agents who can affect the value of an entrepreneurial project. First, an entrepreneur's effort is needed. Second, also the outside advising or
management support exerted by a specialized venture capitalist can contribute to the project value. Because either of these agents can make
private choices and not to exert a socially efficient level of effort, we call the problem of moral hazard in this special case of venture capital as a
double-sided one. There are common characteristics in venture capital, such as the active participation of outside venture capital investors in the
management of the company and the use of convertible securities in venture capital contracting, on which we have a lot of empirical evidence,
and which relate to the &#1088;r&#1086;blem of douse-sided moral hazard.
The purpose of the study is to present two analytical models which discuss the &#1088;r&#1086;blem of double-sided moral hazard and the
remedies to overcome it. The key challenge is to mathematically present the &#1088;r&#1086;blem of double-sided moral hazard, and to study
how convertibles could implement efficient contracts in venture capital.
MODELS
The thesis introduces two different models in venture capital financing. Catherine Casamatta's model is introduced first. Casamatta's model
assumes that the efforts are allocated simultaneously. Casamatta's model sets out to study how outside financing and advising arise endogenously
in the model, and how optimal contracts can be implemented under certain conditions through the use of convertibles. Klaus Schmidt's model is
introduced next. Schmidt's model takes a more focused look at the use of convertibles, assuming that the efforts are allocated sequentially.
RESULTS
Both models show how efficient contracts can be implemented through the use of convertibles. In Casamatta's model we reach optimal
second-best outcomes assuming a simultaneous nature of allocating effort. Casamatta also shows that it is not efficient to include outside
financers, if they cannot provide complementary effort which contributes to the project value. Also, convertible securities should only be used by
investors who have significant financing roles (i.e. venture capitalists, not business angels). Schmidt shows that convertibles can induce first-best
levels of effort, if we allow for sequential nature of allocating effort. The role of convertibles is important.
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